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Abstract In this short paper, I review the literature on
social exchange networks, with specific attention to theo-
retical and experimental research. I indicate how social
exchange theory is rooted in general social theory and
mention a few of its main links to social network analysis
and empirical network research. The paper provides an
accessible entry into the literature on social exchange.
1 Introduction
In this short review paper, I give a synopsis of a special
research field within sociology and social psychology:
social exchange research. The purpose is to draw the
uninitiated reader’s attention to this rich field of social
inquiry by giving a brief overview of the absolute high-
lights from it. I will indicate its roots in social theory and
especially focus on the experimental branch of research in
this tradition. Experimental social exchange research deals
with exchange relations and their embeddedness in net-
works. As such, it is one of the first approaches trying to
enrich network analysis with precise and formalized
behavioral theory. As I will try to argue, it has important
things to say about central concepts from social theory,
such as power, trust, and reciprocity.
2 Exchange relations and exchange networks
Social exchange involves the reciprocal transfer of ‘goods’,
both tangible and intangible, such as practical help, advice,
information, or prestige. For instance, Homans (1958: 606)
states that ‘social behavior is an exchange of goods,
material goods but also non-material ones, such as the
symbols of approval and prestige’. Molm (1997: 12) asserts
that ‘much of what we need and value in life (e.g., goods,
services, companionship, approval, status, information) can
only be obtained from others. People depend on one
another for such valued resources, and they provide them to
one another through the process of exchange’. Finally,
Braun (1993: 1) observes that ‘exchange of (control over)
scarce resources is a fundamental feature of economic and
social life. People exchange physical goods, services, time,
social approval, respect, attention, courtesies, pleasantries,
or favors.’
In the literature, there is little consensus about how
economic and social exchange should be distinguished.
Instead of making this distinction, most exchange
researchers have (implicitly) adopted the meta-theoretical
strategy to theory construction, advocated by for instance
Wippler and Lindenberg (1987) and Coleman (1990).
Thus, theories are proposed about the individual actor in an
exchange relation, models are built based upon these the-
ories, and actual human behavior is compared to the pre-
dictions of these models. Braun (1993: 2) argues explicitly
that this strategy can be applied to social and economic
exchange alike when he writes ‘(…) there is no a priori
reason why economic or non-economic exchange and
related issues should be consequences of different behav-
ioral principles at the level of individual actors.’ Generally
then, social exchange relationships can occur whenever
two or more actors depend on each other for valuable
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outcomes, and social exchange thus broadly conceived has
a long history as an object of social science (e.g., Blau
1964; Ekeh 1974; Homans 1958). The broad conception of
exchange renders it widely applicable and social scientists
have not desisted stressing this wide scope, as exemplified
by the quotes of Homans, Molm, and Braun, above.
More fruitful distinctions than the one between social
and economic exchange have been developed. Famously,
Molm (1997) classifies exchange according to whether it is
reciprocal or negotiated, and whether it is productive,
direct, or indirect. Contrary to reciprocal exchange, nego-
tiated exchange is governed by explicit negotiations over
the terms of the exchange. In direct exchange, actors A and
B directly benefit each other. In indirect exchange, actor B
can reciprocate a benefit received from A by giving to a
member of the social system (e.g., C) other than A. In
productive exchange, both actors in the relation must
contribute for either to benefit. This typology is in accord
with the classical distinction between restricted and gen-
eralized exchange (e.g., Ekeh 1974), the former resembling
negotiated, direct exchange, and the latter reciprocal,
indirect exchange.
A landmark in the development of social exchange
theory is Emerson’s (1962) investigation of power-depen-
dence relations. Emerson (1962: 32) defines the power of A
over B as the ‘(…) resistance on the part of B which can be
potentially overcome by A’, and discusses the embedded-
ness of exchange relationships in the ambient exchange
network, in which a connection between two actors indi-
cates an exchange opportunity. Researchers have investi-
gated how personal, cultural and social differentiations
underlie exchange network structure (Braun 1993) and
what the effects of factors such as uncertainty are on the
emerging network structure (Kollock 1994).
Following Emerson’s seminal work, experimental social
exchange research has focused on the issue of power dif-
ferences in networks of exchange relationships. In experi-
mental studies, participants exchange resources typically
representing a certain monetary value, and power differ-
ences are measured as the payoff differences between
actors arising from exchange. The majority of experimental
studies focus on the distribution of power in static and
exogenous networks (but see, Dogan et al. 2009). A
milestone in this field is the work of Cook et al. (1983),
who show that standard centrality measures badly predict
power distributions in exchange networks. The central
implication from their research is that to understand power
in social networks, one must understand (1) the dyadic
social (exchange) processes on the micro-level, and (2) the
way dyadic relations are connected to the larger network.
Bonacich’s centrality measures (1987) were developed as
an explicit acknowledgment of this discovery.
The issue of micro-level exchange processes is addres-
sed by several algorithms predicting power distributions
across networks (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992;
Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Friedkin 1992; Willer 1999),
many of which are related to cooperative game theory. For
instance, the exchange-resistance solution (Willer 1999) is
equivalent to the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
(Heckathorn 1980), the core (Bienenstock and Bonacich
1992) is itself a common game theory solution, and the
Nash bargaining solution has been extended to exchange
networks (Braun and Gautschi 2006). The most salient
general outcome of this research is the classification of
networks in strong, weak, and equal power structures (e.g.,
Willer 1999), exhibiting large, small, or no payoff differ-
ences between actors in the network, respectively. Differ-
ent algorithms, however, generally differ in the assignment
of networks to the different classes.
Regarding the issue of how exchange relations connect
to form a network, two important classifications have
been developed. The first is the distinction between pos-
itive and negative connection. Two relations are con-
nected positively if exchange in one is contingent on
exchange in the other, and negatively if exchange in one
is contingent on non-exchange in the other. The second
classification distinguishes between exclusive, inclusive,
and null connections (Willer 1992). An actor is exclu-
sively connected if she can exchange with fewer than all
her potential exchange partners, and if she benefits from
each exchange separately. She is inclusively connected if
she can exchange with all her potential exchange partners
and if she has to complete an exchange with all of them
to get any benefit. She is null connected if she can
exchange with all her potential exchange partners and if
she benefits from each exchange separately. The con-
nection type generally affects the power distribution, with
exclusive and negative connections being important
sources of power.
The emphasis in experimental exchange network
research on the distribution of power across network
members has implied a narrowing of the focus of classical
exchange theorists, who were typically more concerned
with the norms, obligations, trust, and commitment created
by social exchanges, rather than with their ‘material’ out-
comes or exact terms of exchange. Within experimental
network exchange research, however, there is also a strong
tradition in the more classical direction, and it is arguably
currently the most vibrant part of exchange research (Molm
et al. 2007; Lawler et al. 2008). The most salient single
finding from this research is the predominant importance of
reciprocal and generalized modes of exchange for the
creation of strong and trustful relationships (e.g., Molm
et al. 2012).
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3 Conclusions
In this short review paper, I have given a very general
overview of social exchange network research in sociology
and social psychology. In the process, I have left many
interesting contributions out, focusing on the absolute
highlights of the field. These are not necessarily better than
other contributions, but in my opinion they do provide the
best entrance into the field for the uninitiated reader.
Although I have almost exclusively discussed theoretical
and experimental work, social exchange theory is very
broad in terms of its potential empirical applications. To
name again but a single highlight, consider Uehara’s
(1990) seminal study of social exchange networks among
unemployed women in Chicago. In addition, social
exchange theory continues to provide a theoretical basis for
social network research (Jackson et al. 2012).
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